Caspian Business Journal

Caucasus Corner: A Viscious Cycle for Georgia

The Caspian Business Journal presents an occasional column from contributor John Mackedon on Georgia and the South Caucasus. 

 Three years.  Three years is the difference between 1989 and 1992 for Russia, Eastern Europe and the rest of the former Soviet Union.  It is the difference between 1999 and 2002 in the United States. And it is the difference between 2001 and 2004 in Georgia.  The world can transform in three years.  Empires can fall.  History can  alter.  Dreams can be born, fostered and, all-too-often, destroyed.  Alternatively, three years can also represent stagnation and an unbearable status quo.  Just ask any resident of St. Petersburg, Russia what 900 days can mean.

 So what will the next three years in Georgia look like?  Change and transformation – at least politically – have defined this small Caucasian nation since gaining independence in 1992.  The three years following independence featured two civil wars, one presidential coup and the foundation of a new nation, based on a new constitution.  The subsequent three years – 1996-1999 – featured two assassination attempts on then-President Eduard Shevardnadze, a second exodus of IDPs from Abkhazia and the beginnings of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project.  The first three years of the new millennium featured Georgia being elevated from the pariah of the Caucasus, under the leadership of Shevardnadze, to the darling of the West, following Mikheil Saakashvili’s rise to power in November of 2003.

This new leadership, however, did not not help stem this vicious and turbulent cycle.  During his first three years of power, Saakashvili was able to bring the renegade Adjara back into the folds of Georgia proper, provide reliable electricity to the country and watched as the first drops of oil flowed over his country from Azerbaijan to Turkey.  The President also managed to lose Russia as a trading partner, force many of his strongest supporters into the opposition and begin aggravating tensions in South Ossetia.  Over the last three years, Saakashvili has been forced into an early presidential election, fought a war with Russia and further lost any claim to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Improved investment climates, increased foreign assistance (to the tune of 3.5 billion following the war) and improved roads (compliments of the Millennium Challenge Corporation) are not adequate enough successes to tip the balance this time.

And so it is with this backdrop that Georgia begins its next three year cycle.  The continuing financial crisis will dictate that poverty will most likely increase among the Georgian population.  Political unrest and dissatisfaction will result in further paralysis of the Georgian government, stymying its ability to implement any effective change (for better or for worse).  And a new administration in Washington, DC searching for improved relations with Russia and alternate geo-strategic outlooks in the Caucasus and Central Asia may leave Georgia scrambling for external political (and military) allies.  All of this does not bode well for Saakashvili’s political survival.  Unfortunately, the survival of the current regime in Georgia is the exact thing this country needs to begin the long and arduous task of creating a functioning and stable state.  Not once in the history of this fledgling democracy has one leader stepped down to allow another leader to take his place.  The order of the day has always been revolutions and coups.  But Georgia has used up its revolution quota and must now begin grappling with the bleaker elements of elections.  By enduring the next three years of Saakashvili’s term and using this time to create and nourish a viable opposition party – propped up by a sustainable and attainable platform of change and growth – the populace can once again begin hoping for an improved situation for themselves and their country.  By by demanding that an unprecedented democratic change of power occur through the perpetuation of this cycle of great successes and often greater failures the Georgian people can break the revolution cycle and turn their efforts toward other detrimental cycles.